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NOTES
FINANCIAL AID FOR NONPUBLIC EDUCATION: A DECISION
FOR THE COURTS OR LEGISLATURES?
I. Introduction
Three distinct financial aid programs for nonpublic education in the state
of New York were attacked as violations of the establishment clause almost
immediately after they became effective. The first program provided for direct
money grants to nonpublic, nonprofit elementary or secondary schools serving
a high concentration of pupils from low-income families.' The grants were to
be used for "maintenance and repair" of facilities and equipment for the purpose
of securing the student's "health, welfare and safety." The second program
was a "tuition reimbursement" plan whereby a low-income parent of a non-
public school student could receive up to $50 per grade school child and $100
per high school student so long as those amounts did not exceed 50% of actual
tuition paid.2 The third program was designed to give tax relief to parents
failing to qualify for the tuition reimbursement because their annual income was
over $5,000.' Under this plan each eligible parent was entitled to deduct a stipu-
lated sum from his adjusted gross income for each child attending a nonpublic
school. The amount of the tax credit decreased as the amount of the taxable
income increased, but was unrelated to the amount of tuition actually paid. A
three-judge district court held that the programs for maintenance and repair
and tuition reimbursements were unconstitutional but that the "tax credit"
provisions did not violate the establishment clause.4 On direct appeal, the Su-
preme Court held in Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist:
All three programs are unconstitutional and violative of the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment since the effect of each of the New York
programs is to provide financial support and encouragement to the religious
mission of sectarian schools. 5
In Sloan u. Lemon, a parent whose children were enrolled in the public
school system brought suit against the State Treasurer of Pennsylvania to have
the Pennsylvania Parent Reimbursement Act for Nonpublic Education6 declared
unconstitutional and to enjoin its operation. This Act provided for the reim-
bursement of tuition payments to parents whose children completed a year of
instruction in a nonpublic school located in Pennsylvania. Reimbursement was
allowed up to $75 for an elementary school child and up to $150 for a secondary
school student, or the actual tuition paid, whichever was less.
1 N.Y. EDUC. LAW, §§ 549-553 (McKinney Supp. 1973-74).
2 N.Y. EDuc. LAW §§ 559-563 (McKinney Supp. 1973-74).
3 N.Y. TAx LAW, § 612 (j) '(McKinney Supp. 1973-74).
4 Committee for Public Education & Religious Lib. v. Nyquist, 350 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
5 93 S. Ct. 2955 (1973) (emphasis added).
6 PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 24, §§ 5701-09 (Supp. 1973-74).
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The Act was challenged on the grounds that it violated both the free exercise
and the establishment clauses of the first amendment of the United States Con-
stitution as well as the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. A
three-judge panel found the Pennsylvania program to be in violation of the
establishment clause because the primary effect of the act was to advance reli-
gion.7 In affirming, the Supreme Court held:
There is no constitutionally significant difference between Pennsylvania's
tuition grant scheme and the New York tuition reimbursement program.
The Pennsylvania Act has the ultimate effect of preserving and supporting
religion-oriented institutions.8
The decisions in these two related cases are indicative of both the national
trend to provide across-the-board financial aid to private and parochial schools
and the general lack of success of these efforts to meet constitutional standards.
In the past state legislatures avoided across-the-board grants such as tuition
payments, teachers' salaries, and large-scale purchases of secular services. The
majority of earlier legislation had involved grants of limited aid in certain non-
educational or secular educational areas. Later legislative efforts have attempted
to separate the secular from the religious educational services in order to provide
tax funds for the one but not the other.
The recent trend in state legislatures has been toward large-scale and
broader based financial support for church-related schools.9 Twenty-three states
have pending or enacted legislation providing for aid which is above and beyond
the generally accepted bus transportation, textbook, and auxiliary facilities acts.
Arizona, Connecticut, Kansas, New Jersey, and West Virginia have proposed or
enacted reimbursement laws generally modeled after Pennsylvania's which are
undoubtedly condemned by the Sloan v. Lemon decision. Five states have en-
acted state income tax credit plans on a broader scale than New York's. The
"shared time" or "dual eurollment" program, whereby children can satisfy the
mandatory attendance requirements in more than one school, is operational in
nine states. Kentucky, South Dakota, New Hampshire, and Maine have legisla-
tion authorizing public school authorities to lease nonpublic school facilities. The
resulting co-occupancy makes the nonpublic school children part-time public
school students eligible under the general subsidy formula for the per student
allotment to the school district.
In order to evaluate the significance of the Nyqult and Sloan decisions, as
well as the constitutional chances of other legislative efforts in this area such as
shared time programs, it is necessary to examine the tests developed by the
7 Lemon v. Sloan, 340 F. Supp. 1356 '(E.D. Pa. 1972).
8 93 S. Ct. 2982 (1973).
9 Committee for Public Ed. & Religious Lib. v. Nyquist, 93 S. Ct. 2993, 2994 n.2 (1973)
(White, J., dissenting).
Beyond the plans enumerated in the text, Louisiana has a tuition voucher plan, while
Kansas and Missouri have proposed variations of that plan. Maryland and Illinois provide
scholarships and grants respectively to nonpublic students based on financial need. Delaware
has pending legislation modeled after the Maryland Law. For a more detailed analysis and
summary of legislative attempts to provide aid to nonpublic education, see Comment, The
Sacred Wall Revisited-The Constitutionality of State Aid to Nonpublic Education Following
Lemon v. Kurtzman and Tilton v. Richardson, 67 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 118, 125-42 (1972).
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Supreme Court in a recent line of cases-tests which dominate any examination
by the Court into the religion clauses of the first amendment.
The first amendment of the United States Constitution provides in part that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof .... ." This clause is divided into two separately treated
sections commonly referred to as the establishment clause and the free exercise
clause. As pointed out by Chief Justice Burger in Walz v. Tax Commission,"°
these religion clauses were not intended to be read as statutes, and there is a broad
range of interpretation available within each clause.
Cases do not always clearly fall under either the establishment clause or
the free exercise clause, but decisions involving aid to sectarian schools have gen-
erally been treated by their authors and by counsel from both sides as establish-
ment clause cases. The two religion clauses of the Constitution, however, are
often in conflict with one another, necessitating the consideration of both clauses
in any case involving aid to nonpublic schools.
II. Background
The first bout with the establishment clause in the realm of aid to nonpublic
education began with Everson v. Board of Education" wherein a New Jersey tax-
payer challenged the validity of a statute which permitted local school boards to
contract for the transportation of children to and from schools other than private
schoois operated for profit. One local school board authorized the reimbursement
of parents for fares paid to public carriers by children attending Catholic schools.
A bare majority of the U.S. Supreme Court held that the expenditure of tax-
raised funds for transportation of parochial school students was a service which a
state may provide to all its children as a general health or safety measure much
like free milk and lunches, nursing services, or dental and eye examinations. The
majority opinion set forth a celebrated interpretation of the establishment clause:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another .... No tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may
be called or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, partic-
ipate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.
In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law
was intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and State.'
12
Ironically, this broad no-aid language has been cited by both advocates and op-
ponents of public aid to nonpublic education. It was obvious to the Everson
10 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). The free exercise and establishment clauses of the first
amendment were applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
11 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
12 Id. at 15-16.
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Court that the bus transportation aided Catholic students in the pursuit of their
religious training,' s but the Court reasoned:
On the other hand, other language of the amendment commands that New
Jersey cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion.
Consequently, it cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Moham-
medans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians or the mem-
bers of any other faith, because of their faith, ur lack of it, from receiving
the benefits of public welfare legislation.' 4
The Court thus resolved a conflict between the two religion clauses of the first
amendment in favor of the free exercise clause.
In an ensuing series of cases, the Court made a cautious retreat from its
position of absolute separation of church and state. In Zorach v. Clauson s the
Court upheld a released-time program whereby public schools in New York,
on receipt of written requests from parents, released students before the close of
the school day so that they might attend religion classes or services outside the
public school premises. In Abington School District v. Schempp'6 the Supreme
Court reviewed a Pennsylvania law which required Bible reading in the public
school classrooms and a Baltimore rule which mandated reading of the Lord's
Prayer. Both laws were found unconstitutional under the establishment clause.
This case is significant in the area of public aid because the Court made its first
attempt to promulgate guidelines for the weighing of legislation challenged under
the establishment clause:
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary
effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of
religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as cir-
cumscribed by the Constitution.' 7 (Emphasis added.)
After Schempp attention returned to the nonpublic school aid cases, and
in Board of Education v. Allen ' U. S. Supreme Court upheld a New York
statute requiring local school boards to furnish secular textbooks to all students
regardless of where they attended school. The Court analogized this New York
statute to the one upheld in Everson, reasoning that the benefits proceeded to the
student or his parents and were merely indirect benefits to the parochial schools,
much like police or fire protection to citizens or buildings generally, regardless of
religious affiliation or character. The law had a secular legislative purpose and
a primary effect that neither advanced nor inhibited religion. 9
13 Id. at 17.
14 Id. at 16.
15 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
16 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
17 Id. at 222.
18 392 U.S. 236 '(1968).
19 Id. at 243. Norwood v. Harrison, 93 S. Ct. 2804 (1973), which was decided the same
day as the Sloan and Nyquist cases, reaffirms the Allen precedent. In Norwood, a Mississippi
statutory program whereby textbooks were lent to students in both public and nonpublic
schools was attacked as a denial of equal protection under the fourteenth amendment in that
many of the private schools to which textbooks were supplied had racially discriminatory
policies. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Allen holding, but was careful to point out that
Allen was not dispositive of the issue at bar.
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The Everson ruling had only taken the nonpublic students to their school's
door; the Allen case is an important precedent because it took the public aid
(textbooks) beyond the door and into the nonpublic classrooms. It is noteworthy
that this case, like others to succeed it, came to the Supreme Court after summary
judgment on the pleadings. Thus, there was no evidentiary record before the
Court. This prompted Justice White to conclude:
Nothing in this record supports the proposition that all textbooks, whether
they deal with mathematics, physics, foreign languages, history, or literature,
are used by the parochial schools to teach religion .... We are unable to
hold, based solely on judicial notice, that this statute results in unconstitu-
tional involvement of the State with religious instruction .... 10
The door was thus opened for arguments in favor of public aid for secular
teachers and a broad range of educational services.
It was not judicially determined that the secular and religious portions of
education in a church-related school could be separated. Allen allowed govern-
ment to aid the secular function in these schools, but it was still uncertain as to
how far or to what degree this aid might extend. There was still the danger that
the "primary effect" test of Schempp would be exceeded.
In Walz v. Tax Commission2 the Court upheld the centuries-old practice
of granting tax-exempt status to church-affiliated schools. Thomas Jefferson's
"wall of separation" was lowered, and a relationship of "benevolent neutrality"
between church and state was announced.2" In treading across the tightrope of a
neutral course, the two Schempp tests were again promulgated without, however,
referring to Schempp. A third criterion developed as a modification of the
Schempp primary effect test when the Court said: "We must also be sure that
the end result-the effect-is not an excessive government entanglement with
religion."2 This entanglement test was described as one of degree.24
It is clear that granting a tax exemption is a far lesser involvement than
taxing church-related properties. The exemption is the antithesis of involvement
-a move away from the entanglements of property taxes.2" But behind all this
logic is a realization that tax-exemptions for churches and church-related schools
have existed for two centuries in our country; the Court was not about to disturb
a system which had functioned so smoothly for such a long time.26 The Walz
[T]he transcendent value of free religious exercise in our constitutional scheme leaves
room for "play in the joints" to the extent of cautiously delineated secular govern-
mental assistance to religious schools, despite the fact that such assistance touches
on the conflicting values of the Establishment Clause by indirectly benefiting the
religious schools and their sponsors. Id. at 2813.
When, however, the sole conflict is with the equal protection clause, and the Constitution
places no value on discrimination as it does on the free exercise of religion, the fourteenth
amendment wins absolutely. The establishment clause permits a greater degree of state assis-
tance to sectarian schools than may be given to private schools which engage in discriminatory
practices.
20 392 U.S. at 248.
21 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
22 Id. at 669.
23 Id. at 674.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 676.
26 Id. at 676-77.
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holding relied heavily on the historical aspect and thus confined, rather than ex-
panded, the areas of permissible state involvement with church-related institu-
tions by demanding close scrutiny of the degree of entanglement.
In summary, the Supreme Court had developed three "cumulative" 7 tests:
1. The statute must have a secular legislative purpose.
2. The statutes principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion.
3. The statute must not foster excessive government entanglement
with religion.
Tilton v. Richardson,2 Lemon v. Kurtzman29 and Earley v. DiCenso°
demonstrate the application of the entanglement doctrine of Walz.
In Kurtzman, the Supreme Court dealt with Pennsylvania's attempt to give
direct subsidies to the nonpublic schools,"1 and in DiCenso scrutinized Rhode
Island's effort to supplement salaries of private school teachers who did not teach
religion.2 Both laws were invalidated under the excessive entanglement theory.
The Court avoided any examination under the primary effect test since it found a
path of least resistance in the entanglement approach.
There are considerable dicta in Kurtzman relating to the Allen suggestion that
religious and secular education are identifiable and separable," but the legislative
attempts to assure separation and to guard against public funds entering the
forbidden area of religious education were the very features which led to the
27 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
28 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
29 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
30 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
31 Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Act 109 of the Pa. General
Assembly, June 19, 1968. That Act empowered the State Superintendent of Public Instruction
to use the proceeds from a certain tax on horse racing for reimbursement to nonpublic schools
for the "purchase of secular educational services." The Act required that the secular teaching
services, textbooks, and instructional materials be approved by the Superintendent of Public
Instruction and that payments be made directly to the school itself. School accounts were
made subject to state audit. No payment was to be made for any course containing "any
subject matter expressing religious teaching." A three-judge district court upheld the con-
stitutionality of the Act, granting defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of
action. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 310 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1969). The two-judge majority ruled
that the purpose and primary effect of the act were secular and that any incidental benefit to
the sectarian schools was not an infringement upon the first amendment.
The safeguards included in the Act impelled the U.S. Supreme Court to declare that the
Act was unconstitutional because of excessive entanglement of the state in the affairs of the
church-related schools. The idea of direct and continuing subsidies to the schools was totally
incompatible with the Court's notion of constitutional separation of church and state. 403
U.S. at 621.
New York, Connecticut and New Jersey all enacted purchase of secular service laws
modeled after the 1968 Pennsylvania legislation. All were constitutionally doomed after the
ruling in Kurtzman. New York Laws, 1970 ch. 138 §§ 1-10 were declared unconstitutional
in Levitt v. Committee for Public Education & Religious Lib., 93 S. Ct. 2814 (1973) affirm-
ing 342 F. Supp. 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
Connecticut's statute, Pub. L. No. 791 '(Jul. 1, 1969) fell in Sanders v. Johnson, 403
U.S. 955 (1971), affirming 319 F. Supp. 421 (D. Conn. 1970).
New Jersey Laws 1970 ch. 235, §§ 1-21 was repealed by New Jersey Laws 1971, ch. 336
§ 10 (Dec. 7, 1971). The repealing act substituted provisions providing for reimbursement
of parents for purchase of secular, nonideological textbooks, instructional materials and
supplies. N.J. STAT. ANN., tit. 18A, §§ 58-60 to 58-67 (Supp. 1973).
32 R.I. GEN. LAWs. ANN. §§ 16-51-1 to-9 (Supp. 1972).
33 403 U.S. at 613.
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condemnation of these two state laws. Without such safeguards, however, the
Court declared that there was a substantial danger that religious instruction
would pervade the secular aspects of pre-college education.34 Consequently,
Kurtzman and DiCenso circumscribed the doctrine of Allen: a textbook can be
categorized as either religious or secular, but a teacher in a church-related school
-even a teacher of secular subjects--cannot separate his religious and moral
instructions from his secular instructions in such subjects as math, physics and
history.
Finally, in Tilton the Court upheld the constitutionality of federal aid to
church-related colleges and universities for construction of buildings and facilities
used exclusively for secular educational purposes. In evaluating the statutes" in
terms of its effect, the Court found that it was carefully drafted to insure that
federally subsidized buildings would be devoted to secular and not religious func-
tions."8 The Court concluded, however, that a provision of the law which per-
mitted unrestricted use of the buildings after 20 years violated the primary effect
test. The entanglement question was also settled in favor of federal aid in the
main thrust of the decision.
The degree of entanglement in Tilton was found to be empirically different
from that found in Kurtzman and DiCenso. The Court reasoned that religious
indoctrination is not the paramount purpose of church-related colleges and uni-
versities while such indoctrination is the avowed dominant policy in the ele-
mentary and secondary schools. Also, the federal grants in Tilton were one time
only, and there was no continuing financial relationship. This should be com-
pared with the Kurtzman and DiCenso legislation where continuing audits and
close scrutiny by state agencies were required.
The Tilton, Kurtzman, and DiCenso decisions must be considered major
setbacks for parochial school aid. The entanglement portion of the primary effect
test has put a double-edged sword in the hands of opponents of public aid to non-
public schools. If legislators include in their statutes safeguards to guarantee
that public funds will go only toward secular education, then there is excessive
entanglement of the state in the affairs of the church; if such safeguards are
34 Id. at 617.
35 Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, 20 U.S.C. §§ 701-58 (1970).
36 403 U.S. at 680. At trial the sectarian colleges presented evidence that there had been
no religious services or worship in the federally financed facilities. Appellants presented no
evidence to the contrary.
37 Id. at 686-87. The doctrine that colleges and universities are more likely beneficiaries
of public aid was reemphasized in Hunt v. McNair, 93 S. Ct. 2868 (1973). The Supreme
Court upheld a South Carolina statute which established an Educational Facilities Authority
to assist higher education institutions in constructing buildings, facilities, etc., but not includ-
ing any facility for sectarian instruction or religious worship. The Act did not violate the
tripartite test employed in Lemon v. Kurtzman even though the Baptist college involved had
a 60% Baptist enrollment.
At the hearing for Nyquist and Sloan there was much dialogue between the bench and
counsel attempting to analogize and/or distinguish the G.I. Bill, 38 U.S.C. §§ 1601-34 (1970)
in reference to tuition grants. Since the G.I. Bill allows a veteran to attend a sectarian uni-
versity or law school, does it not have the effect of indirectly channeling money to religious
institutions? 41 U.S.L.W. 3561 (U.S. Apr. 24, 1973). The constitutionality of the G.I. Bill
is sound, and proponents of the child-benefit theory of nonpublic school aid have latched onto
its operational rationale. See, e.g., Areen, Public Aid to Nonpublic Schools: A Breach of the
Sacred Wall? 22 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 230 (1971). However, the G.I. Bill is placed in no
jeopardy by the failure of the child-benefit theory. The logic of Tilton and Hunt saves the
Bill, since its use is confined to institutions of higher education.
[December 1973]
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omitted, then the statutes are construed as having the primary effect of advancing
religion.8 This feared paradox of Lemon v. Kurtzman turned to stark reality in
Nyquist and Sloan.
III. Nyquist and Sloan
In Nyquist the Court evaluated distinct programs which provided assistance
to nonpublic education at three levels: direct payments to the schools, direct pay-
ments to low income parents, and indirect assistance by means of tax benefits to
middle income parents.8" In Sloan the Court scrutinized state authorized grants
to all parents of children in nonpublic schools regardless of income level. The
programs were scrutinized directly'under the tripartite test derived from Schempp
and Walz. The Court conceded that all the laws involved were gilded with the
proper preambles which gave them a secular legislative purpose. However, the
well-worded legislative policy statements, drafted specifically to meet Supreme
Court standards, could not immunize the statute against further scrutiny under
the "effect" and "entanglement" standards."
38 403 U.S. at 668. (White, J., dissenting).
39 In a separate case decided the same day. the Court decided that yet a fourth provision
of New York's program of assistance to nonpublic education was unconstitutional. See note 31
supra, for the holding of Levitt v. Committee for Public Education & Religious Lib., 93 S. Ct.
2814 (1973). It was argued in Levitt that the State could reimburse church-related schools for
the costs incurred by them in administering services mandated by state law, specifically record-
keeping of health and attendance reports and testing via state-prepared and teacher-prepared
examinations. The Court was fearful since no attempt was made and no means were available
short of "entanglement" to assure that internally prepared tests which have an "integral
role... in the total teaching process" were free of religious instruction. 93 S. Ct. at 2819.
40 The legislative findings of New York's tuition reimbursement act covers a whole range
of social philosophies. N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 559 (McKinney Supp. 1973-74).
The legislature hereby finds and declares that:
1. The vitality of our pluralistic society is, in part, dependent upon the capacity of
individual parents to select a school, other than public, for the education of their
children. A healthy competitive and diverse alternative to public education is not only
desirable but indeed vital to a state and nation that have continually reaffirmed the
value of individual differences.
2. The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized and reaffirmed this right
of selection. This right, however, is diminished or even denied to children of lower-
income families, whose parents, of all groups, have the least options in determining
where their children are to be educated.
3. Quality education is made possible for all children in our state only because the
burden of providing it has been carried by taxpayers who support both public and
nonpublic education. Any precipitous decline in the number of nonpublic school
pupils would cause a massive increase in public school enrollment and costs. Such
an increase would seriously jeopardize quality education for all children and ag-
gravate an already serious fiscal crisis in public education.
4. In recognition of the initiative of parents who support both public and nonpublic
education, it is a legitimate purpose for the state to partially relieve the financial
burden of parents who provide a nonpublic education for their children which satisfies
the compulsory education laws of the state. Such assistance is clearly secular, neutral
and nonideological in nature and is consistent with the historical and continuing role
of the state in providing a quality education for all children and in nurturing a
pluralistic society ....
The district court in Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd mem., 93 S.
Ct. 61 (1972), in examining an Ohio nonpublic school aid law, readily found a well-tailored
and valid secular purpose behind that law and was Prompted to note:
It is the opinion of this Court that the first prong of the Lemon Fv. Kurtzmanl test
will almost invariably be satisfied in cases of this type, and may not truly exist as a




Direct grants to private schools under the maintenance and repair provision
of the New York act were limited to not more than 50% of the average statewide
per pupil cost of maintenance and repair in public schools.4" In addition, only
those schools that served a high concentration of low-income pupils qualified for
this aid. This provision was enacted for the express purpose of protecting the
health and safety of the children attending those schools. As such, the state
urged it was not intended to aid private schools but was a valid exercise of the
state's police power to protect school children generally.
Since the Court had concluded in Tilton that the provision which permitted
unrestricted use of the federally financed buildings on sectarian campuses after
20 years was a violation of the primary effect test, there was no difficulty in
reaching the conclusion that maintenance and repair funds to elementary and
secondary sectarian schools, without any limitation on the use of the funds, had
the effect of subsidizing and advancing the religious mission of the sectarian
schools. This holding was the basis for the Court's decision on the same day in
Levitt v. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty" wherein New
York's subsidy for testing and record-keeping in the private schools was in-
validated. The invalidation of these portions of New York's legislation was a
foregone conclusion after Lemon v. Kurtzman. The Supreme Court has never
allowed direct cash benefits to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools.4"
B. Tuition Reimbursement-The Child Benefit Theory
The tuition relief portion of New York's plan resembled welfare provisions
in which the state participates in helping low-income families. To qualify, the
parent's annual taxable income had to be less than $5,000. The amount of
reimbursement was $50 per grade school child and $100 per high school pupil,
so long as the amounts did not exceed 50% of actual tuition paid. The New
York program required annual appropriations by the state legislature. In
Pennsylvania, to be eligible for the tuition reimbursement of up to $75 for ele-
mentary school students and $150 for secondary school students, each parent was
required to file a verified statement that the student had completed the school
year in a nonpublic school and that he had paid, or had become legally obligated
to pay, tuition in excess of that claimed for reimbursement. Funding did not
41 The 50 percent figure was supposed to supply a statistical guarantee of separation of
secular and religious applications of the funds. The legislature assumed that at least 50% of
the ordinary public school maintenance and repair budget would be devoted to purely secular
upkeep in the sectarian schools. This statistical approach purported to be a replacement for
specific provisions which would have articulated secular restrictions but which would have
been entanglements. The Court was not impressed by this approach which left the sectarian
schools free to spend the money in any way they chose. 93 S. Ct. 2955, 2968 '(1973).
42 93 S. Ct. 2814 (1973). See notes 29, 37 supra.
43 The only cases upholding direct cash benefits to a religiously affiliated institution are
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) and Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
Bradfield dealt with construction grants to hospitals and Tilton concerned similar grants to
institutions of higher learning. Both made lump-sum payments which presumably involve less
entanglement between religion and state than periodic payments. None of the grants' re-
cipients had the primary purpose of religious indoctrination.
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depend upon annual appropriations, but rather was funded by a fixed percentage
of the revenue collected under Pennsylvania's cigarette tax. Both provisions
relied heavily upon the child-benefit theory: grants to parents, unlike grants to
institutions are constitutionally acceptable because the schools receive no direct
benefits. If the money proceeds to the parents who are free to spend the money in
whichever way they like, then although the schools may be indirectly benefited,
the parent or child receives the preponderance of the benefits, and the aid thus
advances education generally-not religion." This theory developed from the
holdings in Everson and Allen but never really received endorsement from the
Supreme Court.
The Chief Justice, in dissenting from the holdings of both the Pennsylvania
and New York cases, asserted the proposition that "government aid to individuals
generally stands on an entirelyifferent footing from direct aid to religious insti-
tutions."4 Justice Powell, writing the majority opinions in both cases,46 was un-
convinced. "[Tihe fact that aid is disbursed to parents rather than to the schools
is only one among many factors to be considered." For much the same reasons
which governed the failure of the maintenance and repair grants, the tuition
reimbursements were held to have the likely effect of advancing or encouraging
the inculcation of religion in the sectarian schools. There was no attempt to
guarantee that the funds given to the parents would no be devoted to religious
educational functions.47 As the Court said in Sloan:
Whether that benefit be viewed as a simple tuition subsidy, as an incentive
44- See generally, Areen, Public Aid to Nonpublic Schools: A Breach of the Sacred Wall?
22 Case W. Ras. L. R1v. 230, 248-53 (1971) ; Choper, Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CALiF. L.
REv. 260, 313-15 (1968); LaNove, The Child Benefit Theory Revisited: Textbooks, Transpor-
tation and Medical Care, 13 J. PUB. L. 76 (1964).
Alternatively stated, the theory urges that the element of parental choice, or voluntarism
in the expenditure of the voucher money sufficiently insulates the state from impermissible
financing of religious activities.
Appellants in Nyquist vigorously argued that the parents were not required to pay the
funds to the parochial schools. The Court reasoned that the state is still not relieved of its
duty to insure that the funds are not used to support religious activities. The Court pointed
to the significant risk that funds may serve to support religious activity. 93 S. Ct. 2955, 2970-71
(1973). Lemon v. Sloan, 340 F. Supp. 1356, 1364 (E.D. Pa. 1972). This significant risk
theory abrogates the religious/secular dichotomy that was accepted in Allen, and embraces
the Tilton teaching that the possibility of a religious use is enough to strike down a public aid
statute. Undeniably, there is a substantial effect which advances religion. The Supreme Court
seems now reluctant to weigh and choose between the various primary effects.
45 93 S. Ct. at 2988, 2990. The Chief Justice relied upon Everson, Allen and Quick Bear
v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 '(1908) for this proposition. The majority made it clear that they
would go no further than Everson and Allen; they distinguished Quick Bear where the funds
which were utilized by the Indians to provide sectarian education were treaty and trust funds
which the Court emphasized belonged to the Indians as payment for the cession of Indian land.
It was their money and the Court held that for Congress to have prohibited them from ex-
pending their own money to acquire religious education would have constituted a prohibition
of the free exercise of religion. Nyquist is quite unlike Quick Bear since the earlier case did
not involve the distribution of public funds, directly or indirectly, to compensate parents who
send their children to religious schools. 93 S. Ct. at 2969 n.37.
46 The majority in both cases consisted of Justices Powell, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart,
Marshall, and Blackmun. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined the majority only
so far as invalidating the maintenance and repair section of the New York law and dissented on
all other provisions. Justice White dissented from the rulings on all provisions.
47 Tilton seems to establish a presumption of secularity in programs of church-affiliated
colleges and universities. Both Tilton, and Lemon v. Kurtzman indicate, however, that as tQ
the education of elementary and secondary school children, the burden of proof of secularity
falls on the school or on the parent. 403 U.S. at 685-86.
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to parents to send their children to sectarian schools, or as a reward for hav-
ing done so, at bottom its intended consequence is to preserve and support
religion-oriented institutions."
The child-benefit theory may still retain some life but only as an explanation
for Everson and Allen. It is now dead as a guiding principle for legislatures
seeking to find a constitutionally acceptable form of aid to nonpublic schools.
C. Tax Benefits
Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the New York legislation49 established a system of
income tax benefits to parents of nonpublic school children. These sections
allowed a parent to subtract from adjusted gross income a specified amount if
they did not receive a tuition reimbursement (because their income exceeded
$5,000) and if their adjusted gross income was less than $25,000. The amount
of the deduction was unrelated to the amount of money actually expended by
the parent on tuition. The amount was calculated on the basis of a formula"0
which assured that the tax benefit would be comparable to the tuition grant to
low-income families. The Court concluded, with surprising ease:
In practical terms there would appear to be little difference, for pur-
poses of determining whether such aid has the effect of advancing religion,
between the tax benefit allowed here and the tuition grant allowed under §
2. The qualifying parent under either program receives the same form of
encouragement and reward for sending his children to nonpublic schools.
The only difference is that one parent receives an actual cash payment while
the other is allowed to reduce by an arbitrary amount the sum he would
otherwise be obliged to pay over to the State. We see no answer to Judge
Hays' dissenting statement below that "[i]n both instances the money in-
volved represents a charge made upon the state for the purpose of religious
education."
51
The majority was careful to point out that the New York program before
them was the only tax procedure upon which they were ruling. They specifically
stopped short of prejudging any program which might have the elements of a
genuine tax deduction or exemption and which might thereby qualify under the
"neutrality" test of Walz. 52 The New York tax credit program was inextricably
linked with the unconstitutional tuition reimbursement provisions. Additionally,
the parents' benefits were unrelated to any deduction available for charitable con-
tributions to religious institutions. The majority felt that the analogy to the
property tax exemption upheld in Walz v. Tax Commission was unpersuasive
48 93 S. at. at 2986. The Nyquist and Sloan holdings should have come as no surprise to
parties on either side of the issue since the result was almost inevitable after Wolman v. Essex,
342 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd memr, 93 S. Ct. 61 (1972). The Ohio law
declared unconstitutional by the district court was generically similar to the Pennsylvania law
providing tuition reimbursements. Also, the New York and Pennsylvania tuition relief acts
had previously been held unconstitutional by unanimous three-judge district courts.
49 N.Y. TAX LAW § 612 (1) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
50 The tables are reproduced in Committee for Public Education & Religious Lib. v.
Nyquist, 93 S. Ct. 2955, 2962 nn.18, 19 (1973).
51 93 S. Ct. at 2974.
52 93 S. Ct. at 2974 n.49.
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since the New York tax benefits were not sufficiently restricted to assure that they
would not have the effect of advancing sectarian activities in nonpublic schools.
The Court has chosen to proceed in this area on a case-by-case basis much
like its examination of "reasonable" searches and seizures under the fourth
amendment. 3 There have been no sweeping utterances, but only fine distinctions
in this sensitive area. However, tax credit programs in other states which are not
applicable to parents of public and nonpublic school children alike and which
are likely to encourage attendance at sectarian schools are in serious jeopardy.5 4
IV. Statistics and Economics
A. The Benefited Class
One difference between tax exemptions for church property (Walz) and
tax benefits for parents is that the property exemptions are not restricted to a
class composed exclusively or predominantly of religious institutions.5 The ex-
emption covers all educational, religious, and charitable purposes. The Court
was preoccupied by the fact that the benefits under nonpublic school aid laws
flowed to too narrow a class.
Proponents of nonpublic school aid argue that the laws do not fix eligibility
along religious lines. Because the act reimburses parents with children in "non-
public" rather than "church-related" or "Catholic" or "religious" schools, pro-
ponents argue that the scope of the act is sufficiently broad to encompass Catholic
and sectarian school students only as incidental beneficiaries. According to this
argument, the Court should find evidence that the state is exercising the "benev-
olent neutrality" defined in Walz. In that case, a concurring opinion pointed to
the proper test for examining neutrality:
53 Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 679 (1970).
54 The Minnesota Tax Credits for Nonpublic Education Support Act of 1971 (MNx.
STAT. § 290.086 (Supp. 1973)) permits parental tax credits against the state income tax
for the amount paid per student for education costs incurred in nonpublic schools. These costs
include tuition, classroom instructional fees, and textbooks. The maximum permissible credit is
determined by the per pupil cost of educating a student at that grade level in a public school.
If the allowable credit exceeds the total income tax due, the state reimburses the parent for
the difference between these amounts. The Minnesota plan would not survive in the federal
courts. Ohio legislation modeled after the Minnesota Act was declared unconstitutional in
Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
Louisiana allows a $50 tax credit for tuition paid to nonpublic elementary and secondary
schools. LA. Rav. STAT. §§ 47:85-:89 (Supp. 1973). California has a provision which allows
for a tax credit which varies in amount, like New York's, depending on adjusted gross income
of the taxpayer. If adjusted gross income is less than $15,000 then the maximum tax credit
is $125. For adjusted gross income of $19,000 and over, there is no credit allowed. CAL. Rav.
& TAx CoDa ANN. §§ 17065-67 (West Supp. 1973).
The Hawaii income tax credit (HAWAII REv. STAT. § 235-57(b) (Supp. 1972)) extends
to any parent whose child "was enrolled or [wasi in attendance as a student at school in grades
kindergarten through twelve." It is interpreted as applying to parents of public or nonpublic
school children, a fact which distinguishes it from other tax credit programs. The maximumyearly credit per student is twenty dollars and that amount diminishes as the adjusted gross
income of the applicant increases.
For a more detailed analysis see Comment, The Sacred Wall Revisited-The Constitution-
ality of State Aid to Non publc Education Following Lemon v. Kurtzman and Tilton v.
Richardson, 67 Nw. U.L. ay. 118, 139-42 (1972); Note, New Trends in Education and the
Future of Parochial Schools, 57 CORNELL L. Rv. 256, 271-72 (1972); Note, Aid to Parochial
Schools-Income Tax Credits, 56 MINN. L. Rav. 189 (1971).
55 93 S. Ct. at 2976.
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In any particular case the critical question is whether the circumference of
legislation encircles a class so broad that it can be fairly concluded that
religious institutions could be thought to fall within the natural perimeter.56
The statistical reality demonstrates that the nonpublic class is not so broad as
one would expect. In Pennsylvania more than 96% of the nonpublic school
students attend church-related institutions; of these schools, 88% are Catholic."
In Ohio approximately 98% of nonpublic students attend denominational
schools; 95% are in the Catholic schools.5" In New York almost 20% of the
state's entire elementary and secondary school population attend over 2,000
nonpublic schools; approximately 85% are church-affiliated."9 Confronted by
such ponderous statistics, it is easy for any court to dismiss neutrality arguments
under the "circumference of legislation" theory. The church-related schools
simply do not fall naturally within the legislation's borders. The predominance of
denominational schools is too great. Throughout the series of opinions in this
area, the Court has stressed that the legislative programs that were constitution-




In reality there would appear to be at least two principal effects of non-
public school aid legislation: one religious, the other secular. On appeal from
pretrial motions to dismiss, before any trial records have been established, it is
difficult to perceive how the Court could hold one effect to predominate over the
other. The parochial schools have an essentially religions role, but they also
perform a secular civic function.
If there were no parochial schools, the state would have to pay for the
secular instruction that the religiously educated children now receive in their
church-related schools. This argument, used by advocates of public aid to cir-
cumvent the primary effect test, expounds the economic woes of both the public
and parochial schools in an attempt to gain sympathy from the courts and to
point up the substantial secular effects of nonpublic school aid. It is persuasive.
A sampling of the statistics will suffice:
1. In 1969, the most recent Catholic investigation into school clos-
ings revealed 295 elementary and 80 secondary schools failed in that
year alone, and 63,697 students were displaced.
61
56 Waz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1973) (Harlan, J., concurring).
57 Sloan v. Lemon, 93 S. Ct. 2982, at 2986 (1973).
58 Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399, 403 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
59 Committee for Public Education and Religious Lib. v. Nyquist, 93 S. Ct. 2955. 2963
(1973). "[A]l or practically all of the 280 schools entitled to receive 'maintenance and repair'
grants are related to the Roman Catholic Church and teach Catholic religious doctrine to some
degree." Id.
60 See e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 602, 687 (1971).
61 OFFICE FOR EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH, UNIV. OF NOTRE DAME, ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
OF NONPUBLIC SCHOOLS: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON SCHOOL FINANCE
5 (1971). (Hereinafter cited as NOTRE DAME REPORT ON NONPUBLIC SCHOOLS.) '(Two re-
ports of this project have been published. One is a substantive summary report; the second is
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2. Decreases in nonpublic school enrollment have been projected
for the next 10 years. Catholic schools, now enrolling 83% of nonpublic
school students, may lose up to 52% of present enrollment if the present
trend continues.62
3. The increased cost to states of absorbing nonpublic school stu-
dents is concentrated in the industrial states of New York, Illinois, Mich-
igan, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio and California."
4. The nation's urban areas, which can least afford the added
burden, would be hardest hit. 4 The concentration in large urban areas
of persons preferring nonpublic schools has resulted in percentages far in
excess of the national average.
65
Such statistics are awesome. They have received judicial notice, but they
have not lessened the fervor with which the Court has enforced its interpretation
of the first amendment. Economic hardship has not been a major criterion for
judging constitutional issues.66 Even if the economic consequences were viewed
sympathetically by the Court, they still would be counteracted by the statistics
showing that the class being benefited is predominantly Catholic. If sectarian
school aid is to succeed, proponents must turn to arguments of a constitutional
stature.
V. The Free Exercise Argument
The theory of absolutism has been completely abandoned. The simplistic
argument that every form of financial aid to church-sponsored activity violates
the "religion clauses" was rejected long ago in Bradfield v. Roberts.67 Bus trans-
portation, textbooks, federal grants, and tax exemptions all have the economic
consequence of aiding religious institutions. Yet all have been constitutionally
upheld.
The primary effect test reads: a statute's principal or primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion. If the large-scale sectarian school
aid bills are going to succeed, their advocates must insist upon more consideration
for the free exercise portion of that test. This free exercise argument has been
a compendium of studies conducted on the several parts of the project. All citations here are
to the summary report.) All of the statistics are compatible with those cited by Justice White in
his dissenting opinion in Nyquist, 93 S. Ct. at 2995.
62 NoTRE DAMFE REPORT ON NONPUBLIC SCHOOLS at 16.
Catholic elementary school enrollment declined from a peak of 4.49 million in 1965 to
3.07 million in 1971. Secondary school enrollment declined from 1.08 million to .95 million
during the same time period.
63 Id. at 17.
64 Id. at 18.
65 The enrollments in nonpublic schools in the country's 15 largest cities, and the cor-
responding percentages are set forth by Justice White in his lengthy presentation of the eco-
nomic argument in Nyquist at page 2995 in footnote 5. One half of all nonpublic school
children attend school in the center cities. In the nation's 10 largest cities, 25 percent of the
school children are in nonpublic schools. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON SCHOOL FINANCE,
SCHOOLS, PEOPLE, AND MONEY: THE NEED FoR EDUCATIONAL REFoRm, FINAL REPORT 54
(1972).
66 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
602, 679 (1971).
67 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
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asserted in the past, but not persuasively. Parents have a constitutional right to
send their children to church-related schools. 6 A constitutional right should be
exercisable without the incurrence of a penalty. Those who exercise this constitu-
tional right, however, must not only pay taxes but also tuition. Thus parents of
nonpublic school children are being handicapped for exercising a constitutional
privilege.
The conflict between the free exercise clause and the establishment clause is
apparent. In certain instances enforcement of the establishment prohibition
serves to protect the values of both constitutional clauses; e.g., the establishment
clause deterrent against government proclamation of an official state church
protects the individual's free exercise rights. If the state, however, in its efforts
to avoid establishment, displays a hostility toward religion, free exercise is en-
dangered. This is the source of the struggle in the courts to find a neutral course
between the two religion clauses.
One extreme denies all aid to nonpublic schools because the establishment
clause must be strictly construed. The other extreme asserts that there be public
aid to sectarian schools as a matter of constitutional right. This second extreme
position was challenged before a three-judge district court in Brusca v. Missouri
ex rel. State Board of Education.61 Plaintiff contended that the Missouri Con-
stitution was invalid in part because it prohibited the use of funds to aid, directly
or indirectly, religious or sectarian schools. The court rejected this argument
relying on Lemon v. Kurtzman and the tripartite test of secular purpose, primary
effect, and excessive entanglement. Although these standards have been applied
generally to establishment clause claims, the court in Brusca found no difficulty in
applying them to a free exercise claim.
[T]he state could not, without manifesting hostility rather than the "whole-
some neutrality" commanded by the First Amendment, prevent a parent
from choosing a sectarian-sponsored private school for no reason other than
its substantial religious character. But a parent's right to choose a religious
private school for his children may not be equated with a right to insist
that the state is compelled to finance his child's nonpublic school educa-
tion .... 70
The voluntary exercise of a right by some parents should not be subsidized
involuntarily by all. If the court in Brusca had sustained the free exercise claim,
it would have conceivably precluded a taxpayer from arguing that he was being
coerced to support religious schools as long as families favoring parochial schools
are forced to support public schools. Modern writers contend that this ap-
proach violates the principle of voluntarism in the religion clauses because in-
dividuals should not be made to support or not support religion."' Thus it is
68 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). This holding was recently reaffirmed
in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
69 332 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. Mo. 1971), aff'd mem., 92 S. Ct. 1493 (1972).
70 Id. at 277.
71 Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARv. L. Rav. 1680, 1685-86 (1969).
The "coercion" theory has been used by opponents of parochial aid to urge that they are
being forced to utilize their tax monies for religious purposes, an inhibition of their first
amendment religious freedom in the sense that the first amendment relieves them of the duty
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argued that voluntarism does not require compensation by the government of
persons disadvantaged due to their religion. On the other hand, if the dis-
advantage stems from the action of the government, i.e., public school taxes, then
the government should be allowed to remedy the situation to permit a person to
freely choose his mode of education. It is apparent that the solution for avoiding
conflict between the establishment and free exercise clauses is a balancing which
attempts to achieve the ideal of "neutrality."
The neutrality concept was born in Everson to resolve just such a con-
flict. In Walz it was expanded to a "benevolent neutrality." The Supreme
Court, in the name of neutrality, has ignored all free exercise arguments by
advocates of large-scale aid to nonpublic schools. Nyquist met the free exercise
argument head-on and strongly reaffirmed the "neutrality" theory."2
A premise of the neutrality theory and an assumption which has been made
by the Court in all of its public aid to nonpublic school cases is that the public
schools are themselves neutral. This assumption could be attacked by an evi-
dentiary presentation at a trial if the nonpublic school aid cases could proceed
past the point of pre-trial motions to dismiss and summary judgment determina-
tion. If the neutrality of the public schools is successfully attacked, then the
whole foundation of neutrality would be substantially shifted,"3 and the door
would be opened to a far greater extent for free exercise claims that the parents
of parochial school students must pay twice-taxes and tuition-for the exercise
of a constitutional right. If it can be shown that the state government is not
neutral in its own administration and dissemination of education in the public
schools, then those who attend schools that are admittedly not neutral can de-
mand greater benefits from the state government.
The unsupported assumption of public school neutrality was spelled out by
Justice Jackson in his dissenting opinion in Everson:
[The public education system] is organized on the premise that secular ed-
ucation can be isolated from all religious teaching so that the school can
inculcate all needed temporal knowledge and also maintain a strict and
lofty neutrality as to religion .... Whether such a disjunction is possible,
and if possible whether it is wise, are questions I need not try to answer.7'
There are two directions in which an attack upon the neutrality of public
schools can travel." The first attempts to show that in the classrooms of our
to support a religion. There must be some showing of coercion, however. See Board of Educa-
tion v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 264 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting); Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S.
306, 311 (1952).
72 93 S. Ct. at 2973.
73 One author contended that the neutrality concept was already on the wane since it
was completely ignored in Tilton. Kauper, Public Aid for Parochial Schools, 13 ARiz. L. Ray.
567, 583 (1971).
74 330 U.S. at 23-24.
75 Freund, supra note 71 at 1689 postulates two different directions: that public school
education is empty of religious content and therefore not genuine education at all. or that it
inculcates a religion of its own, secularism, and hence the parochial schools are entitled to
equal support for their brand of religious education.
This comment finds a different alternative and accepts only Freund's latter postulate as
a possible thesis, though not a likely selection for the courts.
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public schools the doctrine of secular humansm-a religion in itself-is taught.
This argument was before the district court in Brusca v. Missouri. 6
Secular humanism is the philosophy which claims that religion is irrelevant
in the affairs of state and must be kept totally separate. Proponents of sectarian
school aid argue that the teaching of religion is constitutionally banned. Thus,
the doctrine of secular humanism is fostered in the public schools. But secular
humanism is itself a religion much like atheism and is not a neutral philosophy."7
It is totally opposed to the tenets of other religions like Catholicism, Judaism, etc.
Therefore, the state has established its own religion of secular humanism and/or
the state has inhibited the free exercise of religion among those who attend the
public schools and those who embrace a religion other than secular humanism.
This argument had no success before the courts in Brusca because, there
again, the case was decided in the lower court at the pre-trial stage with no
evidentiary presentation to support such an argument. Further, this argument
will likely never have much chance of success in the U. S. Supreme Court since
to embrace such logic the Court would have to reject its own reasoning in a long
line of school prayer cases including McCollum v. Board of Education,7  Engel
v. Vitale,79 and Abington School District v. Schempp. °
The school prayer cases, however, may actually support another line of
attack upon neutrality in public schools. These decisions, which ruled on teaching
of sectarian religion, school prayer, and Bible reading in public schools, under-
score the inescapable nexus between religion and the secular life of the nation.8"
In Engel the majority found that "[t]he history of man is inseparable from the
history of religion."82 In Schempp, we read, "[i]t is true that religion has been
closely identified with our history and government."83 And in Everson v. Board
of Education, Justice Jackson stated: "[o]ur public school system, if not a product
of Protestantism, at least is more consistent with it than with the Catholic culture
and scheme of values."84 What is sought to be established is the thought that
religion in the conventional sense, i.e., religion in the general Christian mold, is
inextricably involved in the instruction given in public schools. General intuition
and personal experience may support this thesis, but the Supreme Court will
require empirical evidence of the kind it is only likely to get if and when a non-
public school aid case passes the pre-trial level in the district courts. The text-
book evidence for this proposition does exist.8 The teaching of religion in public
76 332 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. Mo. 1971), aff'd mem., 92 S. Ct. 1493 (1972).
77 The Supreme Court so held in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.1l (1961);
see Washington Ethical Soe'y v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Valente,
Aid to Church Related Education - New Directions Without Dogma, 55 VA. L. Rnv. 579,
609 (1969).
78 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
79 370 U.S. 421 '(1962).
80 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
81 See Duffy, A Review of Supreme Court Decisions on Aid to Nonpublic Elementary and
Secondary Education, 23 HAST. L.J. 966, 973-74 (1972).
82 370 U.S. at 434.
83 374 U.S. at 212.
84 330 U.S. at 23.
85 Valente, supra note 77 at 595 n.75, 609 nn.141-42, lists the following authorities for
the proposition that conventional religion permeates the public schools: AMERICAN ASSN. OF
SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS, REPORT ON RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 63 (1964); P.
Phenix, THE SCHOLARS LOOK AT SCHOOLS, 18 (1962); Hirst, Public and Private Values, and
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schools is subtle and is not a matter of policy, but the fact of its presence should
call for considerable re-evaluation of the neutrality concept.
VI. Conclusion
It may be that there is no way to subsidize parochial elementary or secondary
schools in any substantial manner. The Court's double-edged sword of the
"effect" and "entanglement" standards may be a way of saying that a little aid
is all right, but a lot is unconstitutional. "The Court may have employed a
verbal formula to impose a quantitative limit upon parochial school funding."
88
It is doubtful that the three-pronged test descended from Schempp and
Walz will be changed. These are sound standards which protect the full interests
of both church and state. We do not need new tests but rather re-emphasis of
certain parts of the existing tests and balancing of all the factors which come into
play under these criteria. There must be a re-emphasis of free exercise rights
when the Court seeks to ascertain the secular purpose, primary effect, and en-
tanglement standards essentially created as establishment clause criteria. Legiti-
mate secular purposes and effects should be given more weight by the Court and
not just summarily dismissed as substantial but irrelevant.
Despite the grave constitutional issues, the problem of nonpublic school aid
inevitably boils down to a question of social philosophy: is the largely urban
phenomenon of nonpublic education desirable? Is pluralism in education to be
encouraged or allowed to decay?
There are many who equate pluralism and diversity with divisiveness and
polarity; the role of education should be the elimination of ethnic and cultural
differences which are the root causes of prejudice and discrimination. On the
other hand, advocates of pluralism assert that nonpublic education is a healthy
alternative to traditional public education. 7 The issue of pluralism is one which
the state legislatures should be entitled to resolve.s
Patrick 1. Broderick
Religious and Public Education, RELIGION AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 330 (A. Sizer ed. 1967);
Hutchins, The Future of the Wall, in THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE, 17, 20 (D.
Oaks ed. 1963); Kohlberg, Moral and Religious Education and the Public Schools, in RELIGION
AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, 164-65 (A. Sizer ed. 1967).
86 Haskell, The Prospects for Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 MINN. L. REv. 159,
181 (1971).
87 See, Americans United for Sep. of Church & State v. Oakey, 339 F. Supp. 545, 553
(Oakes, J., concurring) "(D. Vt. 1972):
In the advancement of this pluralistic society, the parochial school system has
played a not insignificant part. Lemon, I fear, will tend toward a homogenization
of American education. There will, therefore, be all the more reason to search for
ways within the American system of public education that will preserve, indeed pro-
mote, the diversity of individual belief-religious, political and social-that, along
with our Bill of Rights, distinguishes us so plainly from certain uniform, unified and
uni-governed societies elsewhere in the world.
See also Note, Education Vouchers: The Fruit of the Lemon Tree, 24 STAN. L. REv.
687 n.1 (1972):
[The arguments in favor of pluralism] include greater responsiveness by educators
to the demands of education consumers, both parents and children, greater satisfaction
within a community toward its educational system, and increased tailoring of specific
educational programs to individual needs. See, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF PUBLIC
POLICY, EDUCATION VOUCHERS 1-6 '(1970); M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREE-
Dom 91-94 (1962).
88 Cf. New York's statement of legislative policy supra note 40, §§ 1-2.
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